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If I have brought any message today, it is this: Have the courage to 
have your wisdom regarded as stupidity . . . And have the courage to 
suffer the contempt of the sophisticated world. 
Justice Antonin Scalia 
*** 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by 
case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not 
recognize.1 
 The answer to the question of whether the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia is a friend or foe of criminal law and procedure is neither. Justice 
Scalia was an intellectually honest jurist and the outcomes he reached 
were based on the Constitution’s text and original meaning, not on 
subjective values.2 
 Scholars throughout the legal academy have overwhelmingly 
criticized Justice Scalia for his stinging dissents in cases such as Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v. 
1. Fr. Frank Pavone, A Country He Did Not Recognize: A Reflection On The Passing of
Justice Antonin Scalia, Brietbart, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/03/03/a-country-
he-did-not-recognize-a-reflection-on-the-passing-of-justice-antonin-scalia/ (last visited Feb, 1, 
2017). 
2. See Adam Lamparello and Charles E. MacLean: It’s The People’s Constitution, Stupid: 
Two Liberals Pay Tribute to Antonin Scalia’s Legacy, 45 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 281 (2014).  
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Hodges, where Justice Scalia chastised the majority for ignoring the 
Constitution’s text to reach an outcome that the language of the 
constitutional provision at issue—the Fourteenth Amendment—could 
not possibly support.3 In fact, some commentators have gone so far as to 
describe Justice Scalia as racist, bigoted, and homophobic, primarily 
because they disagree strongly with the outcomes that Scalia reached in 
these and other cases.4  For these scholars, the interpretive theory on 
which Justice Scalia relied—originalism—is vacuous in theory and in 
application and is designed to provide Justice Scalia’s conservative 
policy agenda with the thin veneer of legitimacy.5 Perhaps the lack of 
conservative professors on most law faculties is contributing to such 
largely unchallenged groupthink, the essence of which embraces an 
ends-justifies-the-means approach in which the desirability of an 
outcome justifies manipulating, even ignoring, the Constitution’s text.6 
As discussed in this article, such scholars view the courts, not the 
legislature or democratic process, as the forum within which to achieve 
substantive policy changes. Simply put, if the Court’s outcome does not 
accord with their policy predilections, then the Justices in the majority—
and the interpretive theory upon which they rely—must be flawed. The 
reality is that it is the other way around. Those who are focused on 
outcomes and willing to do anything to achieve them embrace an 
approach to constitutional interpretation that is flawed in theory, fatal in 
fact, and undemocratic at its core. The authors are by no means 
conservative, but we know that we have no monopoly on truth, and no 
authority to define what is ‘right’ for everyone. Make no mistake: we do 
not agree with the outcomes Justice Scalia reached in many cases, but 
we respect the process by which he reached those outcomes. 
3. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2012); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 
1 (providing in relevant part that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws”). 
4. See, e.g., Barney Frank, Justice Scalia Is A Homophobe, Politico, (June 26, 2015),
available at: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/justice-scalia-gay-marriage-ruling-
119480; Bridget Todd, Tell Justice Scalia: Apologize For Your Racist Comments About The 
Fourteenth Amendment, available at: https://www.credomobilize.com/petitions/tell-antonin-scalia-
apologize-for-your-foul-remarks-on-race  
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83 (2010). 
6. See Tax Prof Blog, Why Are There So Few Conservative/Libertarian Law Profs, Even 
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 Let’s face it: an outcome-driven model of constitutional 
interpretation results in decisions that are based upon little more than a 
bare majority of the Justices’ subjective policy preferences. As discussed 
below, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court, after conceding that the 
Constitution did not support the outcome it reached, invented 
constitutional “penumbras” to invalidate a ban on contraception and to 
form the basis for creating additional unenumerated rights in the future.7  
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Court, by a 5-4 margin, re-
affirmed Roe v. Wade based on a previously undiscovered right “to 
define one’s own concept of existence . . . and the mystery of human 
life.”8  Of course, none of these “rights” can be found anywhere in the 
Constitution. They can be found, however, in transcendent dimensions 
of dishonesty, hidden under the fragile but transparent veneer of flowery 
rhetoric disguised as constitutional legitimacy. 
 Yet, critics of Justice Scalia, who criticize originalism yet 
countenance outright distortions of the Constitution’s text, celebrate 
these decisions, along with the constitutionally indefensible doctrine of 
substantive due process and the laughable interpretive theory known as 
“living constitutionalism,” which states that constitutional meaning 
changes based on contemporary norms and thus countenances primarily 
moral readings of the Constitution.9 In other words, the Constitution’s 
meaning changes to achieve the political will of a bare majority of the 
Justices. This might be acceptable if it occurred in a kangaroo court, but 
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
8. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning 
of the Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2009). Judge Sutton states as follows: 
One of the great debates in American legal history is whether judicial alterations of the  
Constitution  in the face of the exigencies of the moment represent a good or a bad 
thing—or indeed whether certain landmark decisions  changed  the  meaning  of the 
Constitution. Yet good or bad, a changeable  Constitution, all can agree, presents risks—
risks of putting a singular power, a Framer’s pen, in the hands of five sitting Justices. 
One school of thought, perhaps seeing what has happened over the last 200 years, 
chooses to recognize the undeniable—that the meaning of the Constitution has 
changed—and opts to embrace it. Of course the meaning of the Constitution changes, 
they say, and of course it will be a majority of the Supreme Court who decides when it 
changes. The Constitution, after all, was a blue print of government, not a Napoleonic 
legal code, and its “majestic generalities” were meant to adapt to and be adaptable for 
different ages, different circumstances, even different world views.48  Sized up in this 
way, the U.S. Constitution is a living document, not a dead one; it changes with each 
generation, permitting constructions of the document in one era to be discarded in the 
next; and it is fanciful to think otherwise.  These are the “living constitutionalists”: 
Words, they say, require flexible interpretation, and there is nothing wrong with the 
meaning of words changing over time, especially where that change reflects a shift in 
public consensus about an issue. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/3
2016] ORIGINALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 231 
not in the United States Supreme Court. Of course, what such “theories” 
really countenance is an approach to judicial decision-making in which 
judges arrive at whatever result they deem most desirable and conceal 
their subjectivity under a rhetorical gloss that masquerades as legal 
reasoning. After all, under what provision in the Constitution can one 
reasonably infer that the “right” to “liberty” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment encompasses “the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life,” or that an asserted rights claim can implicate liberty “in its spatial 
and more transcendent dimensions”?10 Then again, why should the 
Constitution matter when the Justices have life-tenure and, as cases such 
as Griswold and Roe suggest, not even the pretense of accountability? 
Well, because these approaches undermine democracy, the rule of law, 
the Court’s institutional legitimacy, and give the few the right to decide 
what is within the province of the people. 
 Of course, these decisions are anything but legitimate, and the 
consistent decline in the Court’s popularity, coupled with the increased 
politicization of the judiciary, which has transformed the judicial 
nomination process into a modern-day soap opera, underscores this 
fact.11 Yet, many scholars and commentators continue to celebrate this 
nonsense—and vilify Justice Scalia—while refusing to admit what any 
reasonable jurist already knows: living constitutionalism is a sham and a 
threat to the bedrock principles of democracy, including separation of 
powers, federalism, de-centralization, and bottom-up lawmaking. On the 
other hand, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence (and originalism itself) does 
not produce intellectually dishonest, outcome-based, value-driven, and 
politically-motivated decisions. 
 This article will focus on Justice Scalia’s originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation in the context of criminal law and 
procedure. An examination of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence 
demonstrates that, more often than not, he agrees with that proposition 
and has reached outcomes that are entirely at odds with his conservative 
policy predilections, that benefit criminal defendants, flag burners, and 
arrestees, and that faithfully apply the Constitution’s text.12 For example, 
10. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
11. See NBC News, Replacing Scalia: A Look Back At Some of the Rockiest Supreme Court
Nominations, available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/after-death-justice-
scalia-look-back-5-rockiest-supreme-court-n519731. 
12. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), infra notes 177-78; see also U.S. v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (2012), infra notes 51-56; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), infra 
notes 105-114. 
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Justice Scalia’s opinions in cases involving the Confrontation Clause 
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments strengthened constitutional 
protections for criminal defendants (and arrestees) and were consistent 
with the Constitution’s text and underlying purposes.13 Justice Scalia’s 
opinions illustrate that it is possible to reach desirable outcomes through 
an intellectually honest decision-making process, and that originalism is 
a legitimate vehicle by which to achieve both objectives. The same 
cannot be said for the Roe, Griswold, and Obergefell majorities. As 
Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe—a liberal-leaning constitutional 
law scholar—said when discussing Roe, “[o]ne of the most curious 
things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the 
substantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.”14 That 
fact should trouble citizens of all political persuasions. 
In the area of criminal law and procedure, Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence demonstrates that he correctly rejects “living 
constitutionalism,” which enables judges “to roam where unguided 
speculation might take them,” and results in decisions that only Anthony 
Kennedy, who invented a right to “equal dignity” under the law, would 
support.15 At bottom, the text is there for a reason—to safeguard against 
the abuse of judicial power and, concomitantly, the usurpation of the 
democratic process. After all, one judge’s view of justice may be 
another’s prescription for injustice, just as one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter. Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation is a testament to the fact that the Court’s “reasoned 
judgment” in the “heady days of the here and now” has led to 
indefensible outcomes that have undermined the Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy, American constitutionalism, participatory democracy, and 
the rule of law.16 Originalism has proven to be the most objective and 
neutral interpretive theory. Its application by Justice Scalia in the face of 
constant criticism and vilification should be viewed as a great feat that 
has advanced American jurisprudence. Thus, scholars and commentators 
who chastise Justice Scalia should first look in the mirror—they might 
discover that they embody precisely what they condemn. 
This article will analyze the utility of originalist constitutional 
interpretation as well as some of the most influential opinions of which 
13. Id.
14. Laurence Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1973); see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973).
15. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997). 
16. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6
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Justice Scalia was a part. Part II will discuss Justice Scalia’s originalist 
approach in contrast to the “living constitution” approach. Part III will 
analyze how Justice Scalia’s devotion to originalism benefited criminal 
law. Part IV will discuss the legacy that Justice Scalia has left in his 
body of case law and how it has and will continue to positively impact 
the law as a whole. 
II. ORIGINALISM—NOT LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM—IS THE
ENDURING THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Sometimes people come up to me and inquire, “Justice Scalia, 
when did you first become an originalist?” As though it’s some weird 
affliction, you know, “When did you start eating human flesh?”17 
Many scholars have criticized Justice Scalia’s originalism over the 
years, but the reason for such criticism is as meritless as the arguments 
supporting living constitutionalism.18 Those who have levied such 
criticisms against Justice Scalia often cite originalism as interpretive 
theory upon which Justice Scalia relies to reach pre-ordained outcomes 
that are consistent with his conservative “right-wing” agenda.19 Yet, 
upon closer analysis, nothing could be further from the truth. Justice 
Scalia has regularly arrived at outcomes that are often contrary to his 
political and ideological values, and Scalia has done so by focusing on 
the process by which decisions are made, not upon the outcomes that he 
thinks should be reached. In other words, Justice Scalia believes that, 
although the Court has the power to say what the law is, it does not have 
the power to say what the law should be.20 Unfortunately, and as 
17. Charlie Spiering, 31 Of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s Greatest Quotes (Feb. 
13, 2016), Breitbart, available at: http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/02/13/supereme-
court-justice-antonin-scalias-greatest-quotes/. 
18. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, New Republic, (Aug. 24,
2012), available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-
originalism 
19. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say 
What The Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222 (1994) (“the presumption should be that the power ’to say 
what the law is’ is not authoritatively vested in a single body with final, unreviewable authority to 
decide all issues for all time”). 
20. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, Joe The Ploughman Reads The Constitution, Or, The Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 578 (2011). Professor Rakove states as 
follows: 
[O]riginalism is the theory of constitutional interpretation that says that the meaning of a 
constitutional text or provision is locked into it at the moment of adoption, and the
proper goal of constitutional interpretation is to ascertain and apply that meaning to the
case at hand.  In a republic in which the adoption of a constitutional text depends directly 
7
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discussed below, the same cannot be said for other members of the 
Supreme Court, such as Justice Anthony Kennedy, who consciously 
manipulate or ignore the Constitution’s text to reach outcomes 
predicated primarily, if not exclusively, on their subjective policy 
predilections. 
 By way of background, originalism, which rightfully remains a 
dominant theory in constitutional interpretation (thanks to Justice 
Scalia), is neither complex nor controversial. The basic premise is that 
the Court should ascribe meaning to the Constitution’s text that is 
consistent with its commonly understood meaning at the time the 
Constitution was adopted.21 Originalism has many variants, and some 
scholars have embraced a less stringent version of originalism, arguing 
that the Court should arrive at a reasonable meaning of the text based on 
either an original or contemporary understanding of the words.22  Under 
this view, the basic premise is the same: the Court should not ascribe 
meaning to the Constitution’s text that its words cannot reasonably 
bear.23 Implicit in this approach is the notion of honesty in decision-
making; the Court should not manipulate or ignore the Constitution’s 
text to achieve pre-determined outcomes, no matter how desirable. 
Doing so gives the Court nearly unbridled authority to invent “rights” in 
the future, removes the constraints on its Article III reviewing authority, 
and undermines the fundamental precepts upon which a democratic 
republic is predicated: federalism, separation of powers, de-
centralization, and bottom-up lawmaking. 
Yet, many commentators have criticized originalism, not primarily 
because of its theoretical underpinnings, but because they dislike the 
on the authority of the people, knowing how a text was understood by both ordinary 
citizens and their elected delegates and legislators matters more than the original 
intentions of its authors. 
21. See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009).
Professor Berman states as follows: 
Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, whatever may 
be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ 
understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target or 
touchstone. Call this subtype of strong originalism “exclusive originalism.” It can be 
distinguished from a sibling view that is a shade less strong—viz., that interpreters must 
accord original meaning (or intent or understanding) lexical priority when interpreting 
the Constitution but may search for other forms of meaning (contemporary meaning, best  
meaning, etc.) when the original meaning cannot be ascertained with sufficient 
confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant of strong originalism “lexical 
originalism.” 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
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outcomes that it produces in some cases.24 Interestingly, though, those 
(including some Justices) who argue that Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence 
is outcome-driven (as discussed below, it is not) and who embrace 
“living constitutionalism,” which states that the Constitution’s meaning 
changes over time based on contemporary values,25 are the ones whose 
approach to constitutional interpretation is outcome-focused and agenda-
driven. For example, consider the Fourteenth Amendment, which states 
in relevant part: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.26 
A reasonable interpretation of this language suggests that states 
cannot impose the death penalty, imprisonment, or forfeiture penalties 
on any citizens unless there are adequate procedures to prevent arbitrary 
and unfair punishments. 
 However, some Justices on the Court, often by bare 5-4 majorities, 
along with commentators who embrace “living constitutionalism,” have 
manipulated or entirely disregarded this language to infer (and therefore 
invent) substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.27 For 
example, in Roe v. Wade, the majority relied on an unenumerated “right” 
to privacy that the Court inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment, 
despite the fact that the Amendment’s language could not possibly 
support such an interpretation.28 In Planned Parenthood, the Court, per 
Justice Kennedy, re-affirmed Roe based on a previously undiscovered 
“right” “to define one’s own concept of existence.  .  . and the mystery of 
human life.”29 Justice Kennedy did so despite conceding that a literal 
reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures 
by which a State may deprive persons of liberty.30 Well, it does suggest 
that. 
 Likewise, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that a statewide 
ban on sodomy among same-sex couples violated the judicially-created 
right to “liberty both in its spatial and in its more transcendent 
24. See id. at 7, 22. 
25. See Sutton, supra note 9, at 1180. 
26. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
27. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-67 (1973). 
28. Id. at 152-56. 
29. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
30. Id. at 846. 
9
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dimensions” (not in any dimension of the Constitution).31 In Obergefell, 
a so-called “right” to “equal dignity” (not equal protection) under the 
law supported recognition of a right to same-sex marriage.32 No credible 
jurist could claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s words support such 
outlandish interpretations—and none do. That may be why the Court felt 
the need to discover invisible constitutional “penumbras” in Griswold, 
invent a right to define “the mysteries of human life” in Planned 
Parenthood, and in Lawrence countenance a transcendent right to 
liberty. What is more, and what is profoundly interesting, is that in each 
of these cases, the Justices in the majority reached outcomes that, 
strangely, coincided with their personal views.33 That is, well, 
interesting. 
 To make matters worse, in these cases the Court’s decisions were 
predicated on blatant distortions and manipulations of the Constitution’s 
text, gave the Court nearly unfettered authority to invent unenumerated 
“rights” in future cases, replaced de-centralization with centralization, 
concentrated rather than separated federal power, and undermined 
citizens’ ability to truly participate in democracy.34 Put simply, the very 
scholars who criticize Justice Scalia as an outcome-focused, agenda-
driven conservative should first look in the mirror and realize that 
they—not Justice Scalia—embody precisely what they criticize. That 
underscores the problem with “living constitutionalism” and outcome-
focused decision-making: it is fundamentally dishonest and results in the 
perception that judges decide cases based on subjective values, not 
constitutional imperatives. It also lends credence to the words of former 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who stated that, “[a]t the constitutional 
level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is emotional. The 
rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilection.”35 
31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
32. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2675 (2012). 
33. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-67; see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851, 846;
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
34. See, e.g., Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy, & Judicial Interpretation:
The Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585, 594 (2005). 
At the turn of the twentieth century, James Bradley Thayer helped to shift the terms of 
the debate to judicial activism versus judicial self-restraint Thayer saw democracy 
operating solely through the elected agencies of government. Therefore, when the non-
elected judiciary failed to defer to the policy choices of those agencies—failed to restrain 
their use of judicial review to negate those policies—the judges were thwarting the 
workings of democracy. As Justice Felix Frankfurter later wrote: “In the day-to-day 
working of our democracy it is vital that the power of the non-democratic organ of our 
Government be exercised with rigorous self-restraint.” 
35. See Melvin Urofsky, William O. Douglas As a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 
10
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That comment should trouble citizens of all political persuasions. 
 In any event, the best way to test whether Justice Scalia was an 
outcome-focused jurist who manipulated the Constitution to advance his 
ideological predilections is to analyze his jurisprudence. Before doing 
so, however, Justice Scalia’s background—particularly his political and 
ideological values—must be accurately categorized. By most accounts, 
Scalia, who was appointed to the Court by President Ronald Reagan, 
embraced conservatism and traditional moral values, was a devout 
Roman Catholic, and advocated for interpreting the Constitution based 
on its original meaning.36 Scalia’s decisions, however, were arguably 
contrary to these values equally as much as they were consistent with 
them. 
In fact, as the discussion below demonstrates, Justice Scalia 
frequently arrived at outcomes that were directly at odds with his 
political values and were produced through reasoning that maintained 
fidelity to the Constitution and remained mindful of the Court’s role in 
American democracy. The same cannot be said of the majority in 
Griswold, Roe, Planned Parenthood, Lawrence, and Obergefell, where 
the Court’s outcomes were a matter of political convenience rather than 
constitutional conviction, and where the rule of law was trumped by the 
rule of oligarchs. 
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ORIGINALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW—AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
Given Justice Scalia’s background as a conservative thinker who 
embraced traditional Judeao-Christian moral values, one would think 
that his decisions in the criminal law context would be pro-law 
enforcement and anti-criminal defendant.37 However, upon closer 
examination, the opposite is true—Justice Scalia’s decisions often 
safeguarded privacy rights against law enforcement’s investigatory 
practices and resulted in enhanced protections at trial for criminal 
defendants.38 
137-38 (1991) (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS at 3 (1980)). 
36. Antonin Scalia, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia (last visited Feb 8,
2017). 
37. Id. 
38. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibos, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, The Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants? 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005). 
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A. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in The Fourth Amendment Context
In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
has repeatedly re-affirmed the original purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment and led to decisions that benefitted criminal defendants and 
limited law enforcement’s authority. 
1. Kyllo v. United States: What Constitutes a Search of a Home
In Kyllo, writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia held that
the use of sense-enhancing technology to gather any information 
concerning the interior of a residence, if the information could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area, constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore requires probable cause and a warrant (absent 
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement).39 In addition, Justice 
Scalia held that the use of thermal imaging to measure heat emanating 
from a home also constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.40 
In support of this holding, Justice Scalia emphasized that, “‘[a]t the 
very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.’”41  Accordingly, “[w]ith few exceptions, the question whether 
a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional 
must be answered no.”42 Justice Scalia conceded that the “permissibility 
of ordinary visual surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well 
into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass,” and “[v]isual surveillance was unquestionably 
lawful because ‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a 
trespass.’”43 However, Justice Scalia recognized that technological 
advances posed threats to privacy in a manner that did not previously 
exist. As Justice Scalia noted, “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the 
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” as technology 
“enabling human flight has exposed to public view. . . uncovered 
portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private.”44 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that thermal 
39. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 33-34. 
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imaging was reasonable because it did not “detect private activities 
occurring in private areas,”45 stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s 
protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality 
or quantity of information obtained.”46 Rather, prior cases “made clear 
that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a 
fraction of an inch,’ was too much, and there is certainly no exception to 
the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front 
door and sees nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.”47 
Indeed, in the home, “our cases show, all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”48 
In so holding, Justice Scalia emphasized that the decision was 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s original purposes: 
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the 
entrance to the house.” That line, we think, must be not only firm but 
also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of 
surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to 
conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in 
this case that no “significant” compromise of the homeowner’s privacy 
has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment forward.49 
For these reasons, when “the Government uses a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”50 
2. United States v. Jones: What Constitutes a Search of Property
In Jones, the Court, per Justice Scalia, held that the use of a GPS
tracking device to monitor a suspect’s movements on a public highway 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.51 Scalia stated that: 
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
45. Id. at 37. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (emphasis in original). 
49. Id. at 40 (internal citations omitted). 
50. Id. 
51. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
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would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted . . . is a “case we have 
described as a ‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ 
to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, and considered to be ’the true and ultimate expression of 
constitutional law’” with regard to search and seizure.52 
Scalia also explained that “[t]he text of the Fourth Amendment 
reflects its close connection to property, because otherwise it would have 
referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”53 
In support of this holding, Justice Scalia connected Fourth 
Amendment violations to both property and common-law trespass, 
holding that “our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”54 
In recent decades, the Court, applying Katz v. United States, had focused 
on the issue of whether an alleged search was subjectively and 
objectively reasonable.55 However, Justice Scalia refused to endorse the 
Katz rationale exclusively, asserting that the approach was consistent 
with the original purposes underlying the Fourth Amendment: 
The concurrence begins by accusing us of applying “18th-century tort 
law.”  That is a distortion. What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee 
against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a 
minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. 
The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively 
Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that 
eliminates rights that previously existed.56 
52. Id. at 404-05 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 406; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (holding that a
warrantless search is unlawful if it violates a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
56. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411-13. Justice Scalia also refused to rely solely on Katz when 
assessing the constitutionality of searches under the Fourth Amendment: 
In fact, it is the concurrence’s insistence on the exclusivity of the Katz test that 
needlessly leads us into “particularly vexing problems” in the present case. This Court 
has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not 
constitute a search. We accordingly held in Knotts that “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.” Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is 
correct to say that “[t]raditional surveillance” of Jones for a 4–week period “would have 
required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” our 
cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that 
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3. Maryland v. King: Invasion of Privacy Through a Buccal Swab
“Search”
In Maryland v. King, the Court held that the use of a buccal swab to 
obtain a defendant’s DNA sample after arrest was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.57 Justice Scalia vigorously dissented, emphasizing 
that this practice constituted a severe—and unconstitutional—invasion 
of a defendant’s privacy. Scalia stated as follows: 
At the time of the Founding, Americans despised the British use of so-
called “general warrants”—warrants not grounded upon a sworn oath 
of a specific infraction by a particular individual, and thus not limited 
in scope and application. The first Virginia Constitution declared that 
“general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact 
committed,” or to search a person “whose offence is not particularly 
described and supported by evidence,” “are grievous and oppressive, 
and ought not be granted.”58   
Justice Scalia also argued that the decision was inconsistent with 
achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, 
is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to 
answer that question. And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into additional 
thorny problems. The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements on public streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses” is no good. (emphasis added). That 
introduces yet another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the 
proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being 
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4–week 
investigation is “surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving 
substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which may 
permit longer observation. What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen 
electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to 
grapple with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a classic trespassory 
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for 
rushing forward to resolve them here. (internal citations omitted). 
57. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1964-965 (2013). 
58. Id. at 1980-81. Justice Scalia further stated: 
Madison’s draft of what became the Fourth Amendment answered these charges by
providing that the “rights of the people to be secured in their persons . . . from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without 
probable cause . . . or not particularly describing the places to be searched.” As ratified,
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause forbids a warrant to “issue” except “upon 
probable cause,” and requires that it be “particula[r]” (which is to say, individualized) to
“the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” And we have held that, 
even when a warrant is not constitutionally necessary, the Fourth Amendment’s general
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches imports the same requirement of individualized
suspicion. (internal citations omitted). 
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the Court’s precedent, which had only allowed suspicionless searches to 
serve the special, not general, needs of law enforcement.59 Noting that 
“[a]lthough there is a ‘closely guarded category of constitutionally 
permissible suspicionless searches,’ Justice Scalia explained that this 
never included searches designed to serve ‘the normal need for law 
enforcement.’”60 Indeed, “[e]ven the common name for suspicionless 
searches—’special needs’ searches—itself reflects that they must be 
justified, always, by concerns ‘other than crime detection.’”61 As Justice 
Scalia explained, the Court previously “approved random drug tests of 
railroad employees . . . but only because the Government’s need to 
‘regulat[e] the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety’ is distinct 
from ‘normal law enforcement.’”62 In addition, the Court has “approved 
suspicionless searches in public schools—but only because there the 
government acts in furtherance of its ‘responsibilities . . . as guardian 
and tutor of children entrusted to its care.’”63 
Moreover, although Justice Scalia conceded that “the Court is 
correct to note that there are instances in which we have permitted 
searches without individualized suspicion,” he noted that “[i]n none of 
these cases . . . did we indicate approval of a [search] whose primary 
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”64 
Scalia stated as follows: 
The Court hastens to clarify that it does not mean to approve invasive 
surgery on arrestees or warrantless searches of their homes. That the 
Court feels the need to disclaim these consequences is as damning a 
criticism of its suspicionless-search regime as any I can muster. And 
the Court’s attempt to distinguish those hypothetical searches from this 
real one is unconvincing. We are told that the “privacy-related 
concerns” in the search of a home “are weighty enough that the search 
may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of 
privacy of the arrestee.” But why are the “privacy-related concerns” 
not also “weighty” when an intrusion into the body is at stake? (The 
Fourth Amendment lists “persons” first among the entities protected 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.) And could the police 
engage, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, in a “brief and . . . 
minimal” intrusion into the home of an arrestee—perhaps just peeking 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1981 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 
(1989)). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1981-82. 
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around the curtilage a bit? Obviously not.65 
Notwithstanding, Justice Scalia noted that “this discussion is beside the 
point,” because “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless 
searches are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary crime-
solving.”66 
For these reasons, Justice Scalia concluded that the Founders would 
have likely found the search at issue contrary to the original purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment: 
Today’s judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving 
more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples from 
anyone who flies on an airplane (surely the Transportation Security 
Administration needs to know the “identity” of the flying public), 
applies for a driver’s license, or attends a public school. Perhaps the 
construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the 
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so 
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.67 
Thus, “[s]olving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it 
occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives 
than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement 
searches.”68 
4. Navarette v. California: Reasonable Suspicion in Relation to an
Anonymous Tip
In Navarette, the Court held that an anonymous tip from a 911 
caller reporting that a vehicle had driven the caller off the road was 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion and therefore justify a stop of 
the vehicle.69 In support of this holding, the majority, per Justice 
Thomas, stated that the call “bore adequate indicia of reliability for the 
65. Id. at 1982. (internal citations omitted). 
66. Id. Justice Scalia also noted:
DNA testing does not even begin until after arraignment and bail decisions are already
made. The samples sit in storage for months, and take weeks to test. When they are
tested, they are checked against the Unsolved Crimes Collection—rather than the
Convict and Arrestee Collection, which could be used to identify them. The Act forbids
the Court’s purpose (identification), but prescribes as its purpose what our suspicionless-
search cases forbid (“official investigation into a crime”). Against all of that, it is safe to
say that if the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.
Id. at 1986. 
67. Id. at 1989. 
68. Id. 
69. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1685 (2014). 
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officer to credit the caller’s account.”70 Specifically, “[b]y reporting that 
she [the caller] had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver 
Ford F–150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily 
claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving,” and 
“[t]hat basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s 
reliability.”71 Justice Thomas also explained there was “reason to think 
that the 911 caller in this case was telling the truth,” because the caller 
reported the incident shortly after it had occurred.72 As Justice Thomas 
explained, “we generally credit the proposition that statements about an 
event and made soon after perceiving that event are especially 
trustworthy because ‘substantial contemporaneity of event and statement 
negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.’”73 
Furthermore, the caller reported an incident that suggested the driver 
was engaged in criminal activity: 
The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction 
and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving. 
Instead, she alleged a specific and dangerous result of the driver’s 
conduct: running another car off the highway. That conduct bears too 
great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to 
be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness. Running another 
vehicle off the road suggests lane-positioning problems, decreased 
vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those 
recognized drunk driving cues.74 
For these reasons, the Court found “the indicia of reliability . . . 
sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver 
of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road.”75 
Justice Scalia wrote a blistering dissent, arguing that an anonymous 
911 call, which merely reported an alleged traffic violation, is plainly 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the driver was engaged 
in criminal activity: 
The Court’s opinion serves up a freedom-destroying cocktail 
consisting of two parts patent falsity: (1) that anonymous 911 reports 
of traffic violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car 
and its location, and (2) that a single instance of careless or reckless 
70. Id. at 1688. 
71. Id. at 1689. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED. RULE EVID. 803(1), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 
371).  
74. Id. at 1691. 
75. Id. at 1692. 
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driving necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkenness. All 
the malevolent 911 caller need do is assert a traffic violation, and the 
targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police. If the 
driver turns out not to be drunk (which will almost always be the case), 
the caller need fear no consequences, even if 911 knows his identity. 
After all, he never alleged drunkenness, but merely called in a traffic 
violation—and on that point his word is as good as his victim’s.76 
Furthermore, the majority’s holding was predicated on the 
unsupported assumption that the driver was engaged in criminal activity: 
All that has been said up to now assumes that the anonymous caller 
made, at least in effect, an accusation of drunken driving. But in fact 
she did not. She said that the petitioner’s truck “[r]an [me] off the 
roadway.” That neither asserts that the driver was drunk nor even 
raises the likelihood that the driver was drunk. The most it conveys is 
that the truck did some apparently nontypical thing that forced the 
tipster off the roadway, whether partly or fully, temporarily or 
permanently. Who really knows what (if anything) happened? The 
truck might have swerved to avoid an animal, a pothole, or a 
jaywalking pedestrian.77 
Simply put, “in order to stop the petitioners the officers here not 
only had to assume without basis the accuracy of the anonymous 
accusation but also had to posit an unlikely reason (drunkenness) for the 
accused behavior.”78 For these reasons, Justice Scalia concluded that, 
although “[d]runken driving is a serious matter . . . so is the loss of our 
freedom to come and go as we please without police interference.”79 
Unfortunately, “[a]fter today’s opinion all of us on the road, and not just 
drug dealers, are at risk of having our freedom of movement curtailed on 
suspicion of drunkenness, based upon a phone tip, true or false, of a 
single instance of careless driving.”80 
5. Riley v. California: Searches of Cell Phones
In Riley, Justice Scalia joined a unanimous Court in holding that
warrantless searches of cellular telephones were not permitted under the 
search incident to arrest doctrine, which authorized limited searches of 
an arrestee to protect officer safety and prevent the destruction of 
76. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 1695. (internal citation omitted).
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1697. 
80. Id. 
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evidence, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.81 To begin with, the 
Court held that searches of cell phones were fundamentally different 
than searches of finite objects that might be found on an arrestee or in a 
motor vehicle: 
The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these 
devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity 
to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, 
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, 
albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.82 
Furthermore, “[i]nternet search and browsing history . . . can be 
found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s 
private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of 
disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”83 In addition, cell 
phones have immense storage capacity and thus implicate privacy 
protections in a manner that searches of finite objects (e.g. plastic 
containers, cigarette packs) do not: 
[A] cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to
convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s
private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs
labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said
of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even
earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding
him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his
communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would
81. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762-63 (1967). In Chimel, the Court created the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, which 
allows warrantless searches of an arrestee’s person to protect officer safety and preserve evidence:  
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to 
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to 
prevent its concealment or destruction. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”—construing 
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence. 
Id. at 762-63. In the years following Chimel, the Court expanded Chimel to allow virtually all 
warrantless searches incident to arrest, even if safety and evidence preservation were not implicated. 
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454 (1981) (expanding Chimel to hold that law 
enforcement officers may search the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle). 
82. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
83. Id. at 2490. 
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routinely be kept on a phone.84 
Indeed, the importance of protecting citizens from such intrusive, 
wide-ranging, and non-particularized searches was “one of the driving 
forces behind the Revolution itself,” and led the Founders to adopt the 
Fourth Amendment.85 As the majority noted, “the Fourth Amendment 
was the founding generation’s response to the reviled “general warrants” 
and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which allowed British 
officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for 
evidence of criminal activity.”86 
B. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in The Sixth Amendment Context
In the Sixth Amendment context, Justice Scalia has repeatedly
reached decisions that protect an accuser’s right to confront witnesses at 
trial, thus benefitting criminal defendants. 
1. Maryland v. Craig: Confrontation Clause in Relation to a Child
Witness
In Maryland, the Court held, per Justice O’Connor, that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause did not prohibit a child witness in 
an abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside the 
defendant’s presence through a one-way closed circuit television.87  
Holding that the appropriateness of doing so must be made on a case-by-
case basis, the Court stated that “[w]e have never held . . . that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the  absolute  right 
to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial.”88 
The majority emphasized that “[t]he central concern of the 
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a 
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of 
an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact”:89 
[T]he right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a
“personal examination,” but also “(1) insures that the witness will give
his statements under oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the
84. Id. at 2491. 
85. Id. at 2494. 
86. Id.
87. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1990).
88. Id. at 844
89. Id. at 845. 
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‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’; [and] 
(3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury
in assessing his credibility.”90
Justice O’Connor noted that the “combined effect of these elements 
of confrontation—physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and 
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—serves the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an 
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is 
the norm of Anglo–American criminal proceedings.”91 
Importantly, however, “[a]lthough face-to-face confrontation forms 
‘the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause,’   we have 
nevertheless recognized that it is not the  sine qua non  of the 
confrontation right.”92 Justice O’Connor noted that “[t]he Confrontation 
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair 
opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as 
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby 
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant 
weight to the witness’ testimony.”93 Simply put, “our precedents 
establish that “the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-
face confrontation at trial,” a preference that “must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”94 
Consequently, although the Clause “prevents a child witness from seeing 
the defendant as he or she testifies against the defendant at trial,” the 
Court found that the statute in question “preserves all of the other 
90. Id. at 845-846 (quoting California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (brackets in
original)) (internal citations omitted). 
91. Id. at 846. 
92. Id. at 847 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 157) (internal citation omitted). 
93. Id. (brackets in original). Justice O’Connor further stated: 
There is doubtless reason for saying that . . . if notes of [the witness’] testimony are
permitted to be read, [the defendant] is deprived of the advantage of that personal
presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection.
But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the
testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the
mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall
not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused. 
 Id. at 3165. 
94. Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895)). 
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elements of the confrontation right,” as a child “must be competent to 
testify and must testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity 
for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and 
defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and 
body) of the witness as he or she testifies.”95 Furthermore, the state has a 
“substantial interest in protecting children who are allegedly victims of 
child abuse from the trauma of testifying against the alleged perpetrator 
and that its statutory procedure for receiving testimony from such 
witnesses is necessary to further that interest.”96 
Justice Scalia drafted a compelling dissent, stating that “[s]eldom 
has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee 
of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion.”97 
Moreover, the “Sixth Amendment provides, with unmistakable clarity, 
that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’”98 Justice Scalia 
explained the implications of the Court’s holding as follows: 
Because of this subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently 
favored public policy, the following scene can be played out in an 
American courtroom for the first time in two centuries: A father whose 
young daughter has been given over to the exclusive custody of his 
estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has been taken into 
custody by the State’s child welfare department, is sentenced to prison 
for sexual abuse on the basis of testimony by a child the parent has not 
seen or spoken to for many months; and the guilty verdict is rendered 
without giving the parent so much as the opportunity to sit in the 
presence of the child, and to ask, personally or through counsel,  ”it is 
really not true, is it, that I—your father (or mother) whom you see 
before you—did these terrible things?” Perhaps that is a procedure 
today’s society desires; perhaps (though I doubt it) it is even a fair 
procedure; but it is assuredly not a procedure permitted by the 
Constitution.99 
Consequently, because “the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, 
and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather than 
conform to, current ‘widespread belief’” that child defendants will be 
traumatized when confronting their alleged perpetrators in Court, Justice 
95. Id. at 851. 
96. Id. at 852. 
97. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 860-61 (quoting U.S. Const., amend. VI).
99. Id. at 861. 
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Scalia would have invalidated the statute.100 
Justice Scalia also rejected the argument that the statute was 
intended to protect the “physical and psychological well-being of child 
abuse victims,”101 stating as follows: 
A child who meets the Maryland statute’s requirement of suffering 
such “serious emotional distress” from confrontation that he ‘cannot 
reasonably communicate’ would seem entirely safe. Why would a 
prosecutor want to call a witness who cannot reasonably 
communicate? And if he did, it would be the State’s own fault. 
Protection of the child’s interest—as far as the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned—is entirely within Maryland’s control. The State’s interest 
here is in fact no more and no less than what the State’s interest always 
is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal 
proceedings: more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an 
unworthy interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian 
one.102 
Justice Scalia also emphasized that “[t]he ‘special’ reasons that 
exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case 
of children’s testimony are perhaps matched by ‘special’ reasons for 
being particularly insistent upon it in the case of children’s testimony,” 
as “studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable to 
suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy 
(or suggestion) from reality.”103 Perhaps most importantly, as Justice 
Scalia noted, the Court is not free to “conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their 
meaning to comport with our findings.”104 
2. Crawford v. Washington: Admissibility of Statements Made
Outside of Court
In Crawford, Justice Scalia drafted the majority opinion holding 
that testimonial statements made outside of court are barred by the 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 867. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 867-68. Justice Scalia further stated:
The Court has convincingly proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest,
and gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guarantees
(everything, that is, except confrontation). I am persuaded, therefore, that the Maryland 
procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is not, however, actually constitutional I
would affirm the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
  Id. at 870. 
104. Id. at 870. 
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Confrontation Clause regardless of their reliability, unless the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the witnesses.105 Justice Scalia began by stating that the “Constitution’s 
text does not alone resolve this case” because “[o]ne could plausibly 
read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who actually testify 
at trial . . . those whose statements are offered at trial . . . or something 
in-between.”106 Turning to the historical record leading to the Clause’s 
adoption, Justice Scalia noted that the “common-law tradition is one of 
live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing,” although “England 
at times adopted elements of the civil-law practice,” in which witness 
statements “were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony.”107 
Importantly, however, “[t]hrough a series of statutory and judicial 
reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation” that limited the 
instances in which witness statements could be read in court.108 In 
addition, courts “developed relatively strict rules of unavailability, 
admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to 
testify in person.”109 Furthermore, decisions in the years following the 
Confrontation Clause’s adoption held that “depositions could be read 
against an accused only if they were taken in his presence,” emphasizing 
that “[i]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no 
man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to 
cross examine.”110 In fact, “[s]ome early cases went so far as to hold that 
prior testimony was inadmissible in criminal cases even if the accused 
had a previous opportunity to cross-examine,” although most held that 
“admissibility depended on a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”111 
Moreover, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to enable a 
defendant to cross-examine witnesses and thereby expose flaws in their 
testimony: 
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed 
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use 
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these 
practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like 
Raleigh’s; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law’s assertion 
105. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004). 
106. Id. at 42-43. 
107. Id. at 43. 
108. Id. at 44. 
109. Id. at 45. 
110. Id. at 49 (internal citations omitted). 
111. Id. at 50. (emphasis in original). 
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of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the 
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be 
interpreted with this focus in mind.112 
In essence, the Framers rejected a “framework . . . so unpredictable 
that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core 
confrontation violations.”113 Accordingly, the historical record supports 
the proposition “that the Framers would not have allowed admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he 
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”114    
3. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Admissibility of Affidavits in
Relation to the Confrontation Clause
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court engaged in, according to Justice 
Scalia’s view, “little more than the application of our holding in 
Crawford v. Washington.”115 The issue before the Court was whether 
affidavits (certificates) of forensic drug analysts were testimonial under 
Crawford, and thus required that the state prosecutor offer the analysts 
for cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause116 as applied to 
state actors.117 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”118 Justice Scalia then 
disassembled each of the “potpourri”119 of arguments interposed by the 
government and the dissenters. The government offered that the analysts 
were not “accusatory” witnesses, inasmuch as they did not “directly 
accuse” the defendant and only offered evidence, the drug testing results, 
that must then be coupled with other evidence.120 Justice Scalia 
dispatched that argument with his characteristically originalist retort: 
“This finds no support in the text of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”121 He 
112. Id. Justice Scalia also noted that “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of 
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’” Id. at 61. 
113. Id. at 63. 
114. Id. at 53-54. 
115. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
116. Id. at 305. 
117. Id. 
118. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
119. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312. 
120. Id. at 313. 
121. Id.
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provided additional textualist support by quoting Crawford: 
To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability 
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination . . . . Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment 
prescribes.122 
Then, to underscore the point, Justice Scalia brings the textual 
analysis full circle: “[T]he Constitution guarantees one way [to test 
testimonial reliability]: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend 
the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”123 
Law enforcement convenience and prosecutorial expedience do not bend 
to the textual dictates of the Constitution: “The Confrontation Clause 
may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is 
equally true of the [constitutionally guaranteed] right to trial by jury and 
the privilege against self-incrimination.”124 
Justice Scalia always began and ended his Sixth Amendment 
analyses with the text of the Constitution and the original intents of the 
Framers and Ratifiers.125 His Sixth Amendment opinions were not 
vehicles to favor a conservative or law enforcement and prosecution 
agenda; they arose and were delimited—always—by the text of the 
document. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s most telling quote in this regard 
arose in Maryland v. King during oral argument.126 In King, the issue 
was whether DNA samples collected from felony arrestees (not 
convicted) violated the Fourth Amendment.127 Witness Justice Scalia’s 
abject rejection of expedience and the State’s interests over the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional guarantees in the following excerpt from 
attorney for Maryland Katherine Winfree’s oral argument and Justice 
Scalia’s mocking retort: 
Attorney Winfree: Since 2009, when Maryland began to collect DNA 
samples from arrestees charged with violent crimes and burglary, there 
had been 225 matches, 75 prosecutions and 42 convictions, including 
122. Id. at 317-18 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62). 
123. Id. at 318. 
124. Id. at 325. 
125. See id. at 325-38. 
126. Transcript of Oral Argument at *3, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-
207). 
127. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966. 
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that of Respondent King. 
Justice Scalia: Well, that’s really good. I’ll bet you if you conducted a 
lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, you’d get more convictions, 
too.128 
Justice Scalia rarely wavered from his textual and originalist 
viewpoint regarding criminal defendants’ rights.129 And when he 
wavered, it was only when he was writing for the majority and had to 
cobble together enough justices to prevail.130 
4. Apprendi v. New Jersey: What Must be Proven Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
In Apprendi, the Court wrestled with the extent of the facts a 
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury absent the 
defendant’s waiver of jury trial.131 The majority held that not only all 
elements of the crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt,132 but all facts, other than prior convictions, that increase the 
crime’s penalty beyond the legislatively prescribed statutory maximum 
must also be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.133 
Justice Scalia echoed the majority’s decision and much of its 
sentiment, but in an uncharacteristically short concurrence, he explained 
the unitary reasoning he would have used to resolve the case: 
originalism and textualism.134 Justice Scalia insisted there was “no 
coherent alternative” to the holding that the right to trial by jury includes 
a right to have a jury decide all facts that enhance the sentence beyond 
the statutory maximum, and to have that decision made beyond a 
reasonable doubt.135 Justice Scalia ended his concurrence with a 
broadside aimed at dissenting Justice Breyer’s judicial activism: 
Justice Breyer proceeds on the erroneous and all-too-common 
assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought to 
mean. It does not; it means what it says. And the guarantee that ‘[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, 
128. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 3. 
129. See King, 133 S. Ct at 1989-990 (Scalia, dissenting). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). 
130. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See also Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (2000). 
132. Id.
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 499. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/3
2016] ORIGINALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 255 
by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content unless it means that all 
the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally 
prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.136 
Justice Scalia’s consistency in construing criminal defendants’ 
rights through the lenses of the text of the Constitution and the original 
intents of the Framers and Ratifiers does not permit him to engage in the 
sorts of ends-means pseudo-jurisprudence that some of his fellow 
Justices routinely employ. Justice Scalia recognized that textualism and 
originalism are not bare legal theories but are, on the contrary, 
compelled by the nature of the Constitution itself as a contract between 
the People and their Government. The Constitution embodies that 
agreement. To the extent the Government adheres to the limits imposed 
by the Constitution and its amendments, the Government retains its right 
to govern. But if the Government fails to adhere to the constitutional 
protections that were quid pro quo for its ratification, the Government 
loses its right to govern. 
Justice Scalia also recognized that the Framers incorporated within 
the Constitution the procedures that must be used to amend it. The 
Framers did not incorporate judicial activism or evolving senses of 
decency or penumbras; rather, the Constitution provides that any 
changes to the Constitution—the agreement between the People and 
their Government—may only be made through the constitutional 
amendment process as ratified by the People. Amendments by judicial 
fiat are constitutionally invalid. 
5. Ring v. Arizona: What Must be Found by a Jury
In Ring, the Court invalidated a statute that, following an
adjudication of guilt by a jury of first-degree murder, authorized the trial 
court to singlehandedly determine the presence or absence of the 
aggravating factors required by Arizona law to support imposition of the 
death penalty.137 The Court held that the statute violated a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions, stating that 
“facts increasing punishment beyond the maximum authorized by a 
guilty verdict standing alone ordinarily must be found by a jury.”138 
Thus, even though “judicial authority over the finding of aggravating 
factors ‘may . . . be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty,’”  the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
136. Id. 
137. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002). 
138. Id. at 605. 
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trial “does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of 
potential factfinders.”139 
Justice Scalia issued a concurring opinion, stating that: 
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them
elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.140
Justice Scalia emphasized that: 
[T]he accelerating propensity of both state and federal legislatures to
adopt “sentencing factors” determined by judges that increase
punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury’s verdict, and my
witnessing the belief of a near majority of my colleagues that this
novel practice is perfectly OK, cause me to believe that our people’s
traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline.141
This state of affairs would certainly be made worse “by the repeated 
spectacle of a man’s going to his death because a judge found that an 
aggravating factor existed.”142 
C. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in the Eighth Amendment Context
Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause jurisprudence is as bound up with the original intent 
of the Framers and Ratifiers as are his jurisprudence in other areas of 
criminal defendants’ rights. He maintains throughout that the “cruel and 
unusual punishments” forbade by the Framers through the Eighth 
Amendment were those punishments that were “modes or acts of 
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that 
the Bill of Rights was adopted.”143 Justice Scalia did not craft his 
arguments to achieve one conservative agenda or another; rather, he 
crafted his arguments in the Eighth Amendment context to honor the 
Constitution, the contract between the People and their Government, in 
its originally intended meaning. He rejected the “death is different” 
mantra of much of the Court, which used the mantra to justify setting 
139. Id. at 607. 
140. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
141. Id. at 611-12. 
142. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
143. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (quoted in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 609 n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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and resetting the “cruel and unusual punishments” bar wherever those 
Justices thought it morally belonged, thus ignoring the Framers’ and 
Ratifiers’ original intents and the People’s adoption thereof at the time. 
1. Atkins v. Virginia: What is Considered Cruel and Unusual
Atkins v. Virginia gave life to the principal enumerated in the Trop
v. Dulles144 holding in 1958 that the contours of “cruel and unusual
punishments” were malleable and could be discerned by reading the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”145 In Atkins, the issue before the Court was whether executing a
mentally retarded murder defendant was, by virtue of the mental status
of the accused, perforce a cruel and unusual punishment.146 The theory
went that if capital punishment was to be reserved for the “worst of the
worst,” a mentally retarded defendant could never fit that category
because of the mental deficit, thus rendering execution disproportional to
the culpability and blameworthiness.147 In Atkins, the majority, while
also rejecting the applicability of deterrence and retribution rationales of
punishment as to mentally retarded defendants,148 rested its analysis in
large part on the trend of state legislative enactments rejecting execution
of mentally retarded defendants.149 The majority of the Court held that
the trend reflected the “evolving standards of decency,” and thus, any
state legislative enactment in opposition to that trend and allowing
execution of mentally retarded defendants was cruel, unusual, and
unconstitutional.150
Justice Scalia found that reasoning to evidence only the majority’s 
activism, ends-over-means reasoning, and hubris: “Today’s decision is 
the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different jurisprudence 
[and] find[s] no support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment . 
. . . Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon 
nothing but the personal views of its Members.”151 Justice Scalia found 
the majority’s decision and reasoning much more social engineering 
than the constitutional jurisprudence it should have been. Lest his 
position be left less than clear, Justice Scalia then labeled the majority’s 
144. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1958). 
145. Id. at 101; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002). 
146. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
147. Id. at 317-21. 
148. Id. at 319-21. 
149. Id. at 313-17. 
150. Id. at 312, 321. 
151. Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reasoning as based on “embarrassingly feeble evidence,”152 and a result 
of “thrashing about for evidence,”153 but saved “the Prize for the Court’s 
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate”154 label to affix to the majority’s use of 
professional and religious groups, the “world community,” and opinion 
polls.155 
Providing a history lesson, Justice Scalia explained that at the time 
of ratification, only “severely or profoundly mentally retarded” were 
relieved of criminal punishments for their crimes.156 He noted that 
mentally retarded persons with less severe deficits were eligible for the 
death penalty.157 Justice Scalia also bemoaned what he saw as the 
arrogance of the majority, which supplanted the People’s conception of 
cruel and unusual punishments with its own.158 The majority admitted 
that it had done just that: “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the 
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the 
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”159 A 
bemused but not amused Justice Scalia found that the majority, in 
applying that reasoning and in executing that power grab, must 
“presumably” feel that they are “really good lawyers . . . . The arrogance 
of this assumption of power takes one’s breath away.”160 
In his Atkins dissent, as with his Fourth and Sixth Amendment 
position, Justice Scalia focused steadfastly on one overarching principle: 
the Government has only those powers the People provided to it within 
the Constitution, and those powers and their limits cannot be changed 
without the consent of the People; judicial fiat is not constitutional 
amendment.161 
2. Roper v. Simmons: Cruel and Unusual Punishment—The Death
Penalty for Defendants Under the Age of Eighteen
In Roper v. Simmons, a majority of the Court, speaking through 
Justice Anthony Kenney, held that execution of a murder defendant who 
152. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (italics in original) (explaining that “severely or
profoundly mentally retarded” persons “generally had an IQ of 25 or below”). 
157. Id. at 351-54. 
158. Id. at 337. 
159. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)) (quoting Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
160. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 339-40, 348-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was under eighteen years of age at the time of the incident was 
unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment.162 The majority 
continued its Atkins strategy in replacing constitutional precepts with the 
Justices’ preferences.163 As in Atkins, the Court in Simmons tallied state 
legislative enactments regarding execution of juvenile murderers, and 
found not a majority or even a strong trend, but found that at least there 
was a “consistent direction of change.”164 
Justice Scalia predictably bridled at the majority’s hubris in 
expressly overruling the contrary decision decided just fifteen years 
earlier in Stanford v. Kentucky,165 and cited Founding Father Alexander 
Hamilton in support: 
In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges the 
power to nullify laws enacted by the people’s representatives, 
Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there was 
little risk in this . . . . But Hamilton had in mind a traditional judiciary, 
“bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and 
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.” 
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today’s opinion makes of 
Hamilton’s expectations, announcing the Court’s conclusion that the 
meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years – not, 
mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that 
the Constitution has changed . . . . Worse still, the [majority of the] 
Court says in so many words that what our people’s laws say about the 
issue does not, in the last analysis, matter: “[I]n the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of 
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment . . . . The Court thus 
proclaims itself the sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards.”166 
True to form, Justice Scalia harkens not to conservative or any 
other political or moral agendas, but to the text of the Constitution and 
the intents of the Framers and Ratifiers. The majority’s self-absorbed 
strategy, wrenching these decisions away from the People, violates the 
spirit and the text of the Constitution. Justice Scalia saw that and was not 
shy about pointing it out: “[A]ll the Court has done today, to borrow 
from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out 
its friends.”167 
162. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005). 
163. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 533, 566-67. 
165. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989). 
166. Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE 
FEDERALIST, NO. 78, at 465 C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). 
167. Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3. Montgomery v. Louisiana: Cruel and Unusual Punishment—
Life Without Parole for Those Under the Age of Eighteen
In Miller v. Alabama, a majority of the Court held that mandatory 
life without parole (“LWOP”) sentences, as applied to offenders who 
were juveniles on the date of their offenses, were unconstitutional in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
clause.168 In Miller, Justice Scalia did not author a separate dissenting 
opinion, but joined in the separate dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito.169 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, after the appellant had spent forty-six 
years in prison on a LWOP sentence for a crime he had committed when 
he was seventeen years old, the majority held that the Miller decision 
was retroactive on state collateral review, because the Miller case 
created a new “substantive rule of constitutional law.”170 Query how the 
Court has the power to enact a “new substantive constitutional rule” 
without any amendment process whatever – but, we digress. 
After referring to the majority’s holding and reasoning as a 
“nothing short of astonishing,”171 “sleight of hand,”172 Justice Scalia 
showed the rest of his cards: “This whole exercise [embodied in the 
majority’s holding, reasoning, and remedy], this whole distortion of 
Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for 
juvenile offenders.”173 Indeed, “[t]his Court has no jurisdiction to decide 
this case, and the decision it arrives at is wrong. I respectfully 
dissent.”174 
Justice Scalia’s death penalty jurisprudence was not heavy-handed, 
prosecution-favoring, or conservative; instead, it was driven by a 
steadfast, textual, and historical application of the Eighth Amendment—
as drafted and ratified. Justice Scalia saw the majority’s repeated 
incursions into State’s rights and legislative power and the majority’s 
recurrent rulings that ignored the People’s wishes and the Constitution’s 
requirements as unconstitutional and anti-democratic. Particularly given 
the one-way ratchet175 that results when the Court, through its majority, 
168. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012). 
169. Id. at. 2477-90. 
170. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016). 
171. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 740 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “[W]here the
punishment is in itself permissible, ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary 
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling 
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declares an entire category of offenders exempt from capital punishment, 
the Court’s constitutional amendment-by-opinion “jurisprudence” is 
constitutional redesign without the People’s consent and ratification. 
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ENDURING LEGACY
If you’re going to be a good and faithful judge, you have to resign 
yourself to the fact that you’re not always going to like the conclusions 
you reach. If you like them all the time, you’re probably doing something 
wrong.176 
Justice Scalia’s decisions in the above cases undermine the 
argument that his decisions are based on his conservative values. This is 
not to say that Justice Scalia’s decisions have never aligned with his 
policy positions, as his opinions in the death penalty context illustrate. It 
is to say, however, that the outcomes Justice Scalia reaches are based on 
his interpretive philosophy, not his ideological disposition. Although 
some may argue that Justice Scalia relies on originalism precisely 
because it allows him to reach politically-motivated outcomes, his 
decisions in cases such as those above undercut that proposition. If 
Justice Scalia were primarily outcome-driven, one would not expect him 
to reach decisions that, in the Fourth Amendment context, safeguard 
arrestees’ privacy rights and curtail law enforcement’s investigatory 
powers, and in the Sixth Amendment context ensure fairer procedures 
for criminal defendants at trial. Furthermore, when interpreting these and 
other constitutional provisions, Justice Scalia relied almost exclusively 
on the text, purpose, and historical record, not on judicially-created 
“penumbras” or “rights” that the Court, in cases such as Planned 
Parenthood, had invented out of thin air or expanded to alarming 
proportions. In so doing, Justice Scalia embraced a limited view of the 
Court’s Article III reviewing power, and reached outcomes that were 
entirely at odds with his subjective values. In fact, if any doubt remains 
regarding the motives underlying Justice Scalia’s decision-making, one 
only need to recall Texas v. Johnson, in which Justice Scalia joined the 
majority opinion of Justice William Brennan that invalidated a law 
banning the burning of the American Flag.177 In that opinion, Justice 
the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions.’” Id. 
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority)). 
176. Spiering, supra note 17. 
177. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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Brennan stated as follows: 
The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who 
feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are 
wrong . . . . And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one’s 
response to the flag burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power 
of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate response to 
burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag 
burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means 
of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by—as one 
witness here did—according its remains a respectful burial. We do not 
consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we 
dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.178 
Years later, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the decision was 
contrary to his personal beliefs, but commanded by the language of 
purposes of First Amendment, stating “[i]f it were up to me, I would put 
in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who burns the 
American flag. But I am not king.”179 Likewise, in Employment Division 
v. Smith, one would not have expected Justice Scalia, a devout Roman
Catholic, to hold that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
did not permit religious organizations to refuse to comply with generally
applicable laws, even if such law incidentally burdened an
organization’s religious beliefs.180 Yet, that is precisely what Justice
Scalia did. Drafting the opinion on behalf of the majority, Scalia stated
as follows:
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a 
century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. 
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for 
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general 
law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The 
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant 
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the 
discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted).” We first had 
occasion to assert that principle in  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878) where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against 
178. Id. at 419-20. 
179. Scott Bomboy, Justice Scalia Rails Again About Flag-Burning ‘Weirdos’, Constitution 
Center (Nov. 12, 2015), available at: http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/justice-antonin-
scalia-rails-again-about-flag-burning-weirdoes/ 
180. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion 
commanded the practice. “Laws,” we said, “are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices . . . . Can a man 
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”181 
Given that Justice Scalia reached such outcomes despite his 
personal values, why would anyone suspect that he based other decisions 
primarily on ideological grounds? It simply does not make sense. What 
does make sense, however, is the proposition that the Court’s liberal-
leaning Justices often decide cases based, at least in part, on their policy 
predilections. For example, in every case involving abortion, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has voted to invalidate state restrictions imposing 
limitations on or restricting access to abortion services, even though the 
abortion right was based on an outright manipulation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s text.182 Likewise, in every case involving the death 
penalty, former Justice William Brennan voted to invalidate statutes 
authorizing the death penalty in every case, even though the death 
penalty, at least in theory and regardless of one’s views as a policy 
matter, is unquestionably constitutional.183 Similarly, Justice Kennedy 
has relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate laws outlawing 
sodomy and banning same-sex marriage based on the notion of liberty 
“in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,” despite conceding that 
“a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the 
procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty.”184 Well, 
the Fourteenth Amendment compels, not merely suggests, that result. 
This is not to say that the outcomes in Roe, Lawrence, and Obergefell 
were not desirable. It is to say that the Court had no authority to reach 
those outcomes. 
181. Id. at 878-79. 
182. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
169-91 (2007). 
183. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1987)
(stating that “adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual 
punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the decision 
below insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case”); see also U.S. Const., 
amend. XIV (because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the state from depriving citizens of “life, 
liberty or property without due process of law,” the Founders implicitly viewed the death penalty as 
constitutional) (emphasis added). 
184. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 846 (1992). 
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Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s decisions reflect an approach to 
constitutional interpretation that embraces humility and respect for the 
Constitution and the rule of law. To begin with, from his opinions it is 
not difficult to discern that Justice Scalia believed that a judge’s power is 
inherently limited in a democratic society. Scalia did not believe that 
nine unelected, life-tenured judges should possess the authority to create 
unenumerated “rights” (e.g., abortion, assisted suicide) that no words in 
the Constitution could support or that, by virtue of the Constitution’s 
silence on a particular issue, were left to the people to decide through the 
democratic process. In Obergefell, Justice Scalia stated as follows: 
It is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. 
It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me.  
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million 
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the 
Supreme Court.  The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in 
fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s 
claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its 
Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional 
revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it 
is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most 
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and 
won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.185 
Justice Scalia did not mince words, declaring that the majority’s 
opinion “is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-
legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of 
government.”186 For Justice Scalia, the Court abuses its power when it 
essentially re-writes through case law what the Framers sought to 
achieve through the amendment process. This type of decision-making 
also ignored the fact that power belongs to the people, and the concept of 
de-centralization enables that power to flow from the bottom-up, not the 
top down. Decisions such as Obergefell replaced de-centralization with 
centralization, and substituted the normative judgments of hundreds of 
millions of people with the policy preferences of a handful of 
unaccountable jurists. How’s that for a democracy? 
Additionally, Justice Scalia revered the Constitution and the rule of 
law. The Constitution’s text, in Scalia’s view, served just as much to 
limit the Court’s power as it did to authorize judicial review. The 
governance structure that the Founders envisioned—a democratic 
185. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627-28 (2015). 
186. Id. at 2629 (emphasis in original). 
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republic—did not enable judges to right every wrong, fashion a remedy 
for every perceived injury, or engage in legal jujitsu to achieve outcomes 
that were predicated on little more than subjective values. Rather, the 
Constitution—through both structural and individual rights provisions—
delineated the contours of the Judiciary’s reviewing power, and that 
power was limited by what the words said—and what they didn’t say. 
As Justice Scalia once said, “[w]ords have meaning. And their meaning 
doesn’t change.”187 And there is no such thing as a moderate or middle-
ground approach to interpreting the text, which is something that judicial 
pragmatists would like people to believe. As Justice Scalia stated, 
“[w]hat is a moderate interpretation of the text? Halfway between what 
it really means and what you’d like it to mean?”188 
 In the final analysis, there is one proposition that citizens of all 
political persuasions should support: the Court does not have the 
authority to manipulate or ignore the text, and when the Constitution is 
silent on an issue, the Court’s obligation is to leave such an issue to the 
democratic and political process. In the same way, the doctrine of stare 
decisis exists to promote respect for precedent, promote certainty and 
predictability in the law, and constrain future members of the Court from 
simply overturning precedent because they disagreed with the outcome. 
The law—and the Court itself—is bigger than the policy predilections of 
a majority because the Founders envisioned a country of laws, not men. 
When constitutional interpretation is approached with these principles in 
mind, power flows all the way down to the people, democracy trumps 
oligarchy, and the will of the people trumps the will of the powerful. 
V. CONCLUSION
Toward the end of the opera Scalia/Ginsburg, tenor Scalia and 
soprano Ginsburg sing a duet: “We are different, we are one,” different 
in our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for the 
Constitution and the institution we serve. From our years together at the 
D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies. We disagreed now and then, but
when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion
ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. Justice 
Scalia nailed all the weak spots—the “applesauce” and “argle 
bargle”—and gave me just what I needed to strengthen the majority 
187. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, New York Magazine (Oct. 6, 2013),
available at: http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/. 
188. Clare Booth, Irreplaceable Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 17, 2016), available at: 
https://cblpi.org/irreplaceable-justice-antonin-scalia/. 
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opinion. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare 
talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. The press referred to his 
“energetic fervor,” “astringent intellect,” “peppery prose,” “acumen,” 
and “affability,” all apt descriptions. He was eminently quotable, his 
pungent opinions so clearly stated that his words never slipped from the 
reader’s grasp. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
*** 
 Justice Scalia was not perfect—no one is—but he was not a 
dishonest jurist. As one commentator explains: 
If Scalia was a champion of those rights [for criminal defendants, 
arrestees], he was an accidental champion, a jurist with a deeper 
objective—namely, fidelity to what he dubbed the “original meaning” 
reflected in the text of the Constitution—that happened to intersect 
with the interests of the accused at some points in the constellation of 
criminal law and procedure.189 
Indeed, Justice Scalia is “more easily remembered not as a champion of 
the little guy, the voiceless, and the downtrodden, but rather, as Texas 
Gov. Greg Abbott said, an ‘unwavering defender of the written 
Constitution.’”190 
 Justice Scalia’s frustration with the Court was certainly evident at 
times during his tenure, and understandably so. In United States v. 
Windsor, Scalia lamented as follows: 
We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all 
sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect 
their resolution.  We might have let the People decide.  But that the 
majority will not do.  Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some 
will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so 
much to so many.  But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the 
winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes 
from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better.191 
The above passage captures the essence of Justice Scalia’s 
philosophy, and the enduring legacy that will carry forward for many 
189. Robert J. Smith, Antonin Scalia’s Other Legacy, Slate, available at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/antonin_scalia_was_often_
a_friend_of_criminal_defendants.html (brackets added). 
190. Id.
191. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). 
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years after his death. At the end of the day, Justice Scalia, whether 
through well-reasoned decisions, blistering dissents, or witty comments 
at oral argument, spoke a truth that transcends time: “[m]ore important 
than your obligation to follow your conscience, or at least prior to it, is 
your obligation to form your conscience correctly.”192 Most importantly, 
“[h]ave the courage to have your wisdom regarded as stupidity . . . and 
have the courage to suffer the contempt of the sophisticated world.”193 
You will be missed, Justice Scalia. You left the Court—and the law—
better than it was before you arrived. 
192. Spiering, supra note 17, available at: http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2016/02/13/supereme-court-justice-antonin-scalias-greatest-quotes/. 
193. Ken McIntyre, The Wit and Wisdom of Scalia: Nine Zingers, Newsweek (Feb. 14, 2016),
available at: http://www.newsweek.com/wit-wisdom-antonin-scalia-426548. 
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